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Congressional oversight of homeland security constantly receives harsh criticism from 
scholars and the media for being disjointed and overbearing. Critics often cite the 
numerous committees and members of Congress that have jurisdiction over the 
Department of Homeland Security. They allege that this disparate oversight leads to 
conflicting direction, inefficiency, and wasted resources. While there is room for 
improvement, congressional oversight is not as fragmented and ineffective as critics 
make it appear. This thesis conducts a historical case study analysis to demonstrate that 
congressional oversight of homeland security is rigorous, systematic, and effective. 
Congressional oversight of intelligence is presented as an example for failure, followed 
by defense oversight, which is presented as an example for success. Careful evaluation 
shows that homeland security oversight more closely resembles the path of defense 
oversight. This research suggests that the aggressive, and at times even overbearing, 
oversight of homeland security policy leads to better results than weak and timid 
oversight.          
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There are hundreds of different ways that terrorist groups can attack the United 
States. In addition to such “traditional” methods as bombings and airplane hijackings, 
terrorists can attack the food supply or water supply; they could release infectious 
diseases; or they might attempt financial attacks and cyber-attacks. All these scenarios 
fall into the realm of homeland security. At the same time, preventing and responding to 
natural disasters like Hurricane Katrina and man-made disasters like the Deepwater 
Horizon oil spill also fall under the umbrella of homeland security. Clearly, the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has an extremely broad mission. Therefore, it 
follows that congressional committees ranging from the House Homeland Security 
Committee to the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry should all 
have some level of DHS oversight. Does the current congressional oversight structure of 
the Department of Homeland Security enhance the national security of the United States?    
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
The formation of DHS was unique in that it was predominantly composed of 
22 pre-existing federal agencies with more than 180,000 employees.1 Each of these 
agencies had a previously established congressional oversight structure. Following its 
creation, DHS essentially absorbed these previous oversight structures. For this reason, 
the majority of scholarly journal articles and media reports deem congressional oversight 
of homeland security dysfunctional. They often cite that no fewer than 88 committees and 
subcommittees in the House of Representatives and Senate claim jurisdiction over DHS.2 
Additionally, they refer to the staggering number of congressional briefings, reports and 
questions for the record to which DHS responds to each year and the strain these requests 
place on department personnel. Critics assert that Congress’ disparate oversight leads to 
conflicting direction and prevents DHS from accomplishing its mission.  
                                                 
1 Booz Allen Hamilton and Partnership for Public Service, Securing the Future: Management Lessons 
of 9/11 (Washington, DC: Partnership for Public Service, 2011), 4. 
2 The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon 
the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), 421. 
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In addition to the primary question this thesis considers, if homeland security 
oversight is so dysfunctional why has Congress not sought change? Partisan polarization 
and “turf battles” are the typical reasons proposed by critics. These explanations imply 
that senators and representatives are unable to put national security considerations past 
their personal quests for power and selfish desires. In contrast, this thesis argues that 
Congress’ decentralized oversight structure is appropriate and effective. Beyond limited 
cases of parochialism, senators and representatives are conducting robust and systematic 
oversight of homeland security. Congress is making appropriate changes to its homeland 
security oversight structure as it gains experience.      
B. IMPORTANCE 
The 2004 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
Report, more popularly known as the 9/11 Commission Report, is a glimpse into the 
inadequacies in government and intelligence that failed to stop the tragedies of  
September 11, 2001. The report not only methodically recounted the events that led up to 
9/11, but it also included multiple recommendations for how the United States can 
prevent similar tragedies in the future. The president and Congress have implemented 
many of these recommendations already. Most importantly, the 110th Congress put into 
action many of the commission’s recommendations with the enactment of Public Law 
110–53, better known as the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 
Act of 2007.3 The act covers a wide array of homeland security issues ranging from 
congressional oversight of intelligence to protection of civil liberties.4 
Congress has not, however, fully implemented at least one point from the 9/11 
Commission: 
Recommendation: Congress should create a single, principal point of 
oversight and review for homeland security. Congressional leaders are 
best able to judge what committee should have jurisdiction over this 
department and its duties. But we believe Congress does have the  
 
                                                 
3 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110–53, 110th 
Cong., 1st. Sess. (August 3, 2007), accessed May 20, 2012, http://intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pl11053.pdf. 
4 Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 
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obligation to choose one in the House and one in the Senate, and that this 
committee should be a permanent standing committee with a non-partisan 
staff.5   
The House of Representatives has established a permanent standing Homeland Security 
Committee, although it is hardly the “principal point of oversight.” Additionally, the 
Senate has transformed the previous Governmental Affairs Committee into the Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee.6 However, this committee also does not 
serve as a “single, principal point of oversight.” At the time of the 9/11 Commission 
Report, approximately 88 committees and subcommittees held jurisdiction over DHS.7 
According to more recent estimates approximately 108 committees and subcommittees, 
412 members of the House, and all 100 senators retain some oversight responsibility over 
the Department of Homeland Security.8 While the 9/11 Commission Report has served as 
a guide for reforming many other aspects of homeland security, and several of its 
recommendations have been implemented, this particular measure remains curiously 
untouched. Arguably, the oversight point is key, if not the key measure; the  
9/11 Commission Report admonishes “Of all our recommendations, strengthening 
congressional oversight may be among the most difficult and important…So long as 
oversight is governed by current rules and resolutions, we believe the American people 
will not get the security they want and need.”9  
Without question, DHS leadership finds the current congressional oversight 
structure burdensome and distracting.10 Between 2004 and 2007 DHS participated in 
                                                 
5 The 9/11 Commission Report, 421. 
6 Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Untangling the Web: Congressional Oversight and 
the Department of Homeland Security,” December 10, 2004, 3.; United States Senate, accessed May 20, 
2012, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/e_one_section_no_teasers/org_chart.htm . 
7 The 9/11 Commission Report , 421. 
8 “Untangling the Web: Congressional Oversight and the Department of Homeland Security,” 2.; 
Sarah Laskow, “Is Congress Failing on Homeland Security Oversight,” iWatch News from The Center for 
Public Integrity, updated May 17, 2011, http://www.iwatchnews.org/2009/07/16/2822/congress-failing-
homeland-securityoversight. 
9 The 9/11 Commission Report , 419.  
10 Secretary Michael Chertoff to Representative Peter King, September 4, 2007, Office of the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, accessed May 20, 2012, 2, 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683475. 
 4
696 congressional hearings and provided 7,864 briefings to Congress.11 Former DHS 
Secretary Michael Chertoff wrote in a letter to House Homeland Security Committee 
Chairman, Peter King, “I … strongly concur with your conclusion that oversight activity 
by some 86 committees and subcommittees of Congress creates a uniquely difficult and 
unnecessary burden for DHS.”12   
This thesis argues that as cumbersome as the current oversight structure may 
seem, it is not detrimental to the national security of the United States. The number of 
terrorist attacks per year has dropped by more than 60 percent in the decade following 
9/11.13 Therefore, Congress is certainly not impeding counterterrorism efforts, and is 
arguably even aiding DHS through their robust oversight. Additionally, homeland 
security is the responsibility of various federal agencies, states, localities and tribal 
authorities, which makes it a widespread issue requiring oversight from a variety of 
congressional committees. A review of testimony and hearings indicates that no one 
agency within DHS is servicing a disproportionate number of requests from Congress.14 
Final coordination may very well go through headquarters DHS, but the written reports 
and testifying officials come from many different agencies. Furthermore, the 
effectiveness of congressional oversight is not meant to be measured by expediency or 
ease of coordination.15 Oversight is meant to ensure that taxpayers’ dollars are used 
properly, executive privileges are not abused, and the homeland is secure.16 This thesis 
does not assert that congressional oversight of homeland security is without flaws. There 
are certainly ways to streamline the oversight of homeland security, but it should not be 
done at the expense of effectiveness.  
                                                 
11 Secretary Michael Chertoff to Representative Peter King, September 4, 2007, 1. 
12 Secretary Michael Chertoff to Representative Peter King, September 4, 2007, 1. 
13 Erin Miller and Kathleen Smarick, “Background Report: 9/11, Ten Years Later,” The National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Reponses to Terrorism, 
http://www.start.umd.edu/start/announcements/BackgroundReport_10YearsSince9_11.pdf. 
14 Hearings located at http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/112-congress.shtm. 
15 Loch K. Johnson, “Congress and Intelligence,” in Congress and the Politics of National Security, 
edited by David P. Auerswald and Colton C. Campbell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 
122. 
16 Johnson, “Congress and Intelligence,” 122. 
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C. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This thesis uses a comparative analysis in examining whether or not the current 
congressional oversight structure enhances homeland security. Congressional oversight 
of DHS is judged against oversight of two other critical national security organizations: 
the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Each of 
these three federal organizations was created after a defining event in United States 
history. The National Security Act of 1947 created both the DoD and the CIA as a 
response to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, which was perceived as a failure of U.S. 
intelligence and an indictment of a fractured military structure. In 2001, President George 
W. Bush proposed the creation of the Department of Homeland Security in the wake of 
the 9/11 tragedy, again in response to the perception of shortcomings within and among 
the agencies that should have kept the nation safe. All three organizations received wide-
ranging congressional oversight responses.  
This study argues that congressional oversight of the Department of Defense is a 
model for success. Upon creation of the DoD, Congress already had an oversight 
structure in place. One year before National Security Act of 1947 the Legislative 
Reorganization Act of 1946 created the current House and Senate Armed Services 
(HASC/SASC) Committees.17 Additionally, Congress has displayed a history of rigorous 
systematic oversight of DoD. In their 1984 seminal work “Congressional Oversight 
Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms” Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas 
Schwartz classified oversight methods into two general categories. The first, “police 
patrol,” refers to oversight conducted on a routine basis, whereas the second, “fire 
alarm,” is a more reactive method of oversight.18 The literature review in Chapter II 
contains a full examination of McCubbins and Schwartz’s article. Congress has a history 
of favoring police patrol oversight over DoD keeping the department free from major  
 
 
                                                 
17 Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,  Pub. L. No. 29–401, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (August 2, 
1946). 
18 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols and Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (1984): 166.   
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scandals or failures for its 65-year history. Although there have been instances where fire 
alarm oversight was necessary, Congress has not relied on it as a primary method of 
oversight. 
In contrast, congressional oversight of the CIA is seen in this thesis as an example 
of failure. Congress has shown a preference for the fire-alarm method of oversight for 
reviewing intelligence. Separate committees for intelligence oversight did not even exist 
until almost 30 years after the creation of the CIA. Only after the Church and Pike 
Committees of the mid-1970s uncovered serious executive branch abuses of power and 
disregard for constitutional principles did Congress create the intelligence committees. 
Unfortunately, what seemed like drastic reform had very little impact on curbing 
executive branch abuses. Congress had long ago surrendered many of its typical 
systematic oversight tools in the name of secrecy and then failed to reclaim them after the 
Church and Pike Committees released their findings. The Iran-Contra scandal occurred 
less than ten years later. Furthermore, the intelligence community’s slow adaptation  
to the post-Cold War world is often cited as a critical shortcoming leading to the  
9/11 tragedy.19 Once again systematic and rigorous congressional oversight could have 
helped to expedite the intelligence community’s transition. All of these events serve as 
strong arguments against the fire-alarm method of oversight. To reduce the scope of the 
comparative analysis, this thesis only examined pre-9/11 oversight of the CIA. The 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, passed in an effort to follow 
the 9/11 Commission Report’s recommendations, significantly changed the organization 
of the intelligence community.20 Most notably the act consolidated the national 
intelligence community under a single Director of National Intelligence (DNI).21 
Although the new structure is not evaluated in the comparative analysis, this 
thesis briefly comments on whether the post-9/11 structure has improved congressional 
oversight of intelligence. Additionally, a pre-9/11 analysis still allows for 54 years of 
                                                 
19 Prevalent theme throughout 9/11 Commission Report, particularly Chapter 13. 
20 Intelligence and Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108–458, 108th Cong., 2nd Sess. (December 17, 
2004), accessed 1 June 2012, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/108/s2845/text. 
21 Intelligence and Reform Act of 2004, Title I, Subtitle A, Sec 102. 
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intelligence oversight data to draw from and compare to the 10-year life of the 
Department of Homeland Security. Finally, the term “intelligence oversight” will be used 
interchangeably with oversight of the CIA.   
Congress has predominantly used the police patrol method of oversight with 
regard to the Department of Homeland Security. The number of briefings, testimonies, 
and reports that Congress requests from DHS is evidence of systematic and rigorous 
oversight. Additionally, a wide array of representatives and senators take an active role in 
oversight of homeland security. Regardless of their motivations, members of Congress 
are engaged in monitoring DHS and DoD but remain unassertive in intelligence 
oversight. Therefore, the comparative analysis reveals that DHS oversight is more closely 
aligned with DoD oversight and is subsequently poised for success. The defining events, 
types of oversight, and levels of success are summarized in Table 1.  
 










Police Patrol Strong Oversight 
W/Minimal Executive 
Branch Abuse 




Fire-Alarm Weak Oversight/ 
Significant Executive 
Branch Abuse 
DHS 9/11 DHS 
created 
Police Patrol Strong Oversight 
Table 1.   Agency-Type of Oversight-Results 
The results of the comparative analysis challenge the common complaints about 
the current congressional oversight of DHS. The analysis demonstrates that diverse 
oversight is necessary and that the briefings, testimonies, and reports are not to be viewed 
as a nuisance; they are simply Congress doing its job. Given the breadth of homeland 
security, a single point of oversight is impossible and undesirable.   
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II. THE CREATION AND EVOLUTION OF DHS 
Expert panels recommended the idea of a DHS-like organization to Congress and 
the president several months before the September 11, 2001, attacks. The Gilmore 
Commission and the Hart Rudman Commission both concluded that the United States 
needed to consolidate national homeland security efforts.22 The Gilmore Commission, 
formally known as the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for 
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), was chaired by former 
Virginia Governor James Gilmore.23 The commission released its first annual report in 
1999, and as the name implies, focused primarily on the government’s preparedness to 
“deter, detect, interdict, prevent, or respond to” WMD terrorist attacks.24 Although the 
panel did not explicitly recommend a single national security agency it did note the 
disparate nature of federal detection and response capabilities.25 Additionally, it 
highlighted the fact that no one was “in charge” in the event a terrorist attack occurs.26 
Despite these observations very little was done to consolidate national security efforts. 
Subsequently, the Department of Defense chartered the Hart Rudman 
Commission, or The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, to 
“conduct a comprehensive review of the early 21st Century global security 
environment.”27 This study, which took a broader view than the Gilmore Commission, 
was also directed to develop a plan to combat the emerging security environment. The 
                                                 
22 Advisory Panel to Assess Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, I. Assessing the Threat (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO 1999);The United States Commission on 
National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: Imperative for Change  (Washington, DC: 
U.S. GPO 2001).  
23 Advisory Panel to Assess Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, I. Assessing the Threat,B-2. 
24 Advisory Panel to Assess Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, I. Assessing the Threat, 39. 
25 Advisory Panel to Assess Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, I. Assessing the Threat, Common theme throughout much of the report. 
26 Advisory Panel to Assess Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, I. Assessing the Threat, 61. 
27 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: 
Imperative for Change, 130.  
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commission released its report to Congress and the president on February 15, 2001, and 
prophetically stated that, “[a] direct attack against American citizens on American soil is 
likely over the next quarter century.”28 The members of the commission made the 
following recommendation:  
We therefore recommend the creation of an independent National 
Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) with responsibility for planning, 
coordinating, and integrating various U.S. government activities 
involved in homeland security. NHSA would be built upon the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, with the three organizations currently 
on the front line of border security—the Coast Guard, the Customs 
Service, and the Border Patrol—transferred to it. NHSA would not only 
protect American lives, but also assume responsibility for overseeing the 
protection of the nation’s critical infrastructure, including information 
technology.29 (emphasis in original text) 
Once again, these recommendations were not implemented by Congress or the White 
House until well after the 9/11 tragedy. 
On October 8, 2001, President George W. Bush issued Executive Order 13228 
establishing DHS’s predecessor, the Office of Homeland Security (OHS), and naming 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge as director.30 As the Director of the “Office” of 
Homeland Security, Ridge had few resources, and little staff, funds, or authority to 
coordinate homeland security efforts across the country at the federal, state, and local 
levels.31  Additionally, with the organization’s status as an “Office” rather than a 
                                                 
28 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: 
Imperative for Change, viii. 
29 The United States Commission on National Security/21st Century, Roadmap for National Security: 
Imperative for Change, viii.   
30 Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 
accessed September 24, 2012,  http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-homeland-security; Richard S. 
Conley, “The Department of Homeland Security and the Dual Politics of Reorganization: Presidential 
Preemption, Agency Restructuring, and Congressional Challenges” (Paper prepared for the conference 
“The Presidency, Congress, and the War on Terrorism: Scholarly Perspectives,” Department of Political 
Science, University of Florida), 2, http://www.clas.ufl.edu/users/rconley/conferencepapers/Conley.PDF ; 
Jane Bullock et. al., Introduction to Homeland Security: Principles of All-Hazards Response, 3rd ed. 
(Boston: Butterworth-Heinman, 2009), 36.  
31 Tom Ridge with Larry Bloom, The Test of Our Times (New York: Thomas Dunne/St. Martin’s, 
2009), 44–46 and 87. 
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“Department,” Congress had no control of the process.32 This situation led to an almost 
immediate call from the legislative branch to establish a cabinet level department.33 
Initially President Bush opposed creating a Department of Homeland Security. Within a 
few months, however, he changed his mind and in June 2002 submitted to Congress the 
White House’s own proposal for DHS.34 The proposal incorporated many of the 
recommendations from the Hart Rudman and Gilmore Commissions. On June 24, 2002, 
Representative Richard K. Armey introduced legislation in the House to establish the 
department, and the Senate introduced a parallel bill shortly afterwards.35 The bills passed 
through the House and Senate with votes of 295–132 and 90–9.36 President Bush signed 
Public Law 107–296 on November 25, 2002, to officially establish the Department of 
Homeland Security.37  
DHS officially began operations on March 1, 2003, and marked the largest change 
in federal government structure since the National Security Act of 1947.38 Tom Ridge 
remained in charge of the organization and became the department’s first secretary. 
Although DHS was built from twenty two pre-existing agencies, not all organizations 
were transferred as intact entities. The United States Coast Guard (USCG), 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and the Secret Service were transferred in 
one piece. Many border security functions, however, were not transferred intact. The 
functions of the previous U.S. Customs Service and Immigration and Naturalization 
Service are now spread across three DHS agencies: Customs and Border Protection 
                                                 
32 Conley, “The Department of Homeland Security and the Dual Politics of Reorganization: 
Presidential Preemption, Agency Restructuring, and Congressional Challenges,” 2. 
33 Conley, “The Department of Homeland Security and the Dual Politics of Reorganization: 
Presidential Preemption, Agency Restructuring, and Congressional Challenges,” 2.  
34 Conley, “The Department of Homeland Security and the Dual Politics of Reorganization: 
Presidential Preemption, Agency Restructuring, and Congressional Challenges,” 2; President George W. 
Bush, The Department of Homeland Security, June 2002, accessed May 20, 2012, 4, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/book.pdf.  
35 Bullock, Introduction to Homeland Security, 53. 
36 Conley, “The Department of Homeland Security and the Dual Politics of Reorganization: 
Presidential Preemption, Agency Restructuring, and Congressional Challenges,” 3 and 6. 
37 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–296, 107th Cong., 2nd Sess. (November 25th, 
2002), accessed June 1, 2012, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/107/hr5005/text. 
38 Creation of the Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/creation-department-
homeland-security. 
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(CBP), Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services (USCIS).39 Finally, some smaller functions of other executive 
departments were absorbed by DHS. For details see Table 2. 
  Original Agency Original Dept.  Current Agency in DHS 
1 The U.S. Customs Service Treasury Split among CBP and ICE 
2 INS Justice Split among CBP, ICE, and USCIS 
3 The Federal Protective Service GSA  ICE (until 2009, moved to NPPD) 
4 TSA Transportation Stand alone 
5 FLETC Treasury Stand alone 
6 
Animal and Plant Health Inspection 
Service Agriculture (partial) 
CBP(agricultural and imports and 
entry inspections) 
7 Office for Domestic Preparedness Justice FEMA 
8 FEMA Independent Stand alone 
9 
Strategic National Stockpile and the 
National Disaster Medical System HHS Returned to HHS in July 2004 
10 Nuclear Incident Response Team Energy FEMA 
11 Domestic Emergency Support Teams Justice FEMA 
12 NDPO Justice – FBI FEMA 
13 CBRN Countermeasures Programs Energy Science and Technology Directorate 
14 
Environmental Measurements 
Laboratory Energy Science and Technology Directorate 
15 
National BW Defense Analysis 
Center Defense Science and Technology Directorate 
16 Plum Island Animal Disease Center Agriculture Science and Technology Directorate 
17 Federal Computer Incident Response GSA U.S.-CERT, in NPPD 
18 National Communications System Defense NPPD 
19 NIPC Justice - FBI Dispersed throughout DHS 
20 
Energy Security and Assurance 
Program Energy Office of Infrastructure Protection 
21 U.S. Coast Guard Transportation Stand alone 
22 U.S. Secret Service Treasury Stand alone 
Table 2.   Agencies Transferred to DHS40 
                                                 
39 Who Became Part of the Department, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed September 
24th, 2012. http://ipv6.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm. 
40 Table 2 created by author using information obtained from the following sources: Who Became 
Part of the Department, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed September 24th, 2012, 
http://ipv6.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0133.shtm; LCDR D.C. Baldinelli, “The U.S. Coast Guard’s 
Assignment to the Department of Homeland Security: Entering Uncharted Waters or Just a Course 
Correction?” United States Coast Guard, December 9, 2002, 
http://www.uscg.mil/history/articles/Homeland_Security_Baldinelli.asp;  Secret Service History, United 
States Secret Service, accessed September 24, 2012 http://www.secretservice.gov/history.shtml; U.S. 
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, The Federal Protective Service and Contract 
Security Guards: A Statutory History and Current Status, by Shawn Reese, CRS Report RS22706 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 20, 2009), 1; U.S. Library 
of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After 
Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of Statutory Provisions, by Keith Bea, CRS Report RL33729 (Washington, 
DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, March 6, 2007), 3–6. 
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A. THE REORGANIZATION OF DHS 
On February 15, 2005, Michael Chertoff relieved Tom Ridge as the Secretary of 
Homeland Security.41 Soon thereafter, he started a Second Stage Review (2SR) that was a 
“‘systematic evaluation of the Department’s operations, policies and structures.’”42 
Secretary Chertoff released the results of 2SR on July 13, 2005, and summarized them in 
a “six-point agenda.”43 
1. Increase overall preparedness, particularly for catastrophic events. 
2. Create better transportation security systems to move people and cargo more 
securely and efficiently. 
3. Strengthen border security and interior enforcement and reform immigration 
processes. 
4. Enhance information sharing with our partners. 
5. Improve DHS financial management, human resource development, 
procurement and information technology. 
6. Realign the DHS organization to maximize mission performance.44 
 
To achieve these goals Secretary Chertoff implemented several internal 
reorganization measures. Notable additions to DHS were a Directorate of Policy, Office 
of Intelligence and Analysis, a Director of Operations Coordination, and a Directorate for 
Preparedness.45 FEMA became a direct reporting unit to the Secretary and the Federal Air 
Marshal Service was moved from ICE to TSA.46 Secretary Chertoff also eliminated the 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate and made CBP and ICE direct reporting 
elements.47 In his proposed plan, the Director of Operations Coordination would assist 
the Secretary in managing all the different operational elements.48 The 2SR plan intended 
                                                 
41 Former Secretaries of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed 
September 25, 2012, http://ipv6.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0585.shtm. 
42 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Department of Homeland Security 
Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative, by Harold C. Relyea and Henry B. Hogue, CRS Report RL33042 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, August 19, 2005), 1. 
43 Relyea and Hogue, The 2SR Initiative, 1.  
44 Department Six Point Agenda, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, accessed September 25, 
2012, http://ipv6.dhs.gov/xabout/history/editorial_0646.shtm. 
45 Relyea and Hogue, The 2SR Initiative , 4–9. 
46 Relyea and Hogue, The 2SR Initiative , 8, 11. 
47 Relyea and Hogue, The 2SR Initiative, 8. 
48 Relyea and Hogue, The 2SR Initiative, 8. 
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to “flatten” the organization.49 Some members of Congress expressed concern over the 
increase from 22 to 27 direct reporting units to the Secretary.50 The House Committee on 
Homeland Security thought “a Secretary less able or influential than Secretary Chertoff 
may become overwhelmed.”51 Additionally, other members of Congress found the re-
organization quite extensive and asserted that Secretary Chertoff may be overstepping the 
authority designated to him in Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002.52 The 
changes, however, took effect and are depicted in Figure 1 (before) and Figure 2 (after). 
 
 
Figure 1.  Department of Homeland Security Prior to 2SR53 
                                                 
49 Relyea and Hogue, Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative, 16. 
50 Relyea and Hogue, Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative, 16. 
51 Relyea and Hogue, Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative, 16. 
52 Relyea and Hogue, Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR Initiative , 15. 
53 Figure 1 from Department of Homeland Security: Organizational Chart, March 2003, U.S. 




Figure 2.  Department of Homeland Security: Current Structure54 
Almost immediately after implementing the changes prompted by the 2SR the 
department underwent another series of major reforms. At the end of August 2005, 
Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast and the public viewed the federal 
government response, in particular FEMA’s, as slow and unorganized. Many members of 
Congress felt that DHS had become too terrorism focused and could no longer effectively 
respond to “all-hazards.”55 Therefore, they enhanced FEMA’s ability to respond to 
disasters through Public Law 109–295, or The Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 
2006. As envisioned by the 2SR, FEMA remained a direct reporting unit within DHS. 
The Secretary, however, could no longer move or change FEMA’s structure during future 
reorganizations (as previously allowed under Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002.)56 The Post Katrina Emergency Reform Act of 2006 statutorily mandated 
                                                 
54 Figure 2 from U.S. Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart, accessed September 
28, 2012, http://ipv6.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-orgchart.pdf. 
55 Bea, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of 
Statutory Provisions, 5. 
56 Bea, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of 
Statutory Provisions, 6; Relyea and Hogue, Department of Homeland Security Reorganization: The 2SR 
Initiative, Summary. 
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FEMA’s structure and position within DHS. FEMA also absorbed many of the previous 
Preparedness Directorate’s functions which further increased its autonomy as the primary 
disaster relief organization.57 Finally, the FEMA Director could now report directly to 
Congress, as the heads of the USCG and the Secret Service were authorized to do.58 
The structure of DHS remains largely unchanged since the Post Katrina 
Emergency Reform Act. The budget, however, has grown considerably, from 
$30.5 billion in 2002 to a peak of $50.6 billion in 2008.59 Recent years have suffered 
small cuts bringing the 2013 estimate to approximately $45 billion.60 Although DHS’s 
budget has grown by approximately 50 percent over the last 11 years its funding remains 
lower than the budget of most other executive branch departments. The Departments of 
Health and Human Services, Defense, Treasury, Agriculture, Veteran’ Affairs, Labor, 
Transportation, and Education all have larger budgets.61Additionally, DHS’s budget only 
amounts to 1.2 percent of the $3.84 trillion national budget estimated for 2013.62 The 
relatively small budget provides funding for all the major operational elements of 
homeland security including the USCG, Secret Service, ICE, and CBP.63 The budget is of 
particular importance because the “power of the purse” is one of Congress’ primary 
methods of exerting influence over executive branch agencies. 
B. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE         
Congress’ oversight responsibilities are implicit throughout the Constitution. Its 
duties are reinforced through a system of checks and balances. The legislative branch 
                                                 
57 Bea, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of 
Statutory Provisions, 5.  
58 Bea, Federal Emergency Management Policy Changes After Hurricane Katrina: A Summary of 
Statutory Provisions, 6. 
59 From downloadable excel file “Table 5.2 Budget Authority by Agency 1976–2017,” at Historical 
Tables, Office of Management and Budget, accessed September 29, 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals. 
60 “Table 5.2 Budget Authority by Agency 1976–2017.”  
61 “Table 5.2 Budget Authority by Agency 1976–2017.” 
62 “Table 5.2 Budget Authority by Agency 1976–2017.” 
63 “Department of Homeland Security” PDF file at The Budget, Office of Management and Budget, 
accessed September 29, 2012, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Overview. 
 17
carries the power to declare war, authorize the budget, and make laws.64  The 
responsibility to oversee the executive is further explained in Federalist Paper No. 51, in 
which James Madison wrote: “In republican government, the legislative authority 
necessarily predominates.”65  Not only does Congress have the authority to hold the 
executive branch accountable for its actions, it also has the prerogative to do so however 
the members see fit. Scholar Walter J. Olzesek summarizes the different techniques 
Congress has employed in his Congressional Research Service Report, Congressional 
Oversight: An Overview.66  He lists ten different methods of congressional oversight, 
which are as follows: hearings and investigations, the authorizing process, the 
appropriations process, Inspectors General (IG), Government Accountability Office 
(GAO), reporting requirements, Senate confirmation process, program evaluation, 
casework, and impeachment and removal.67    
Matthew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz would classify these ten oversight 
methods into two their general categories, “police patrol” and “fire alarm.”68  The term 
“police patrol” refers to oversight conducted on a routine basis, such as the authorizing 
and appropriations process, standard reporting required by law, and periodic requests for 
information.69 On the other hand, “fire alarm” oversight is exercised through 
investigations, hearings, and in extreme cases impeachment.70 McCubbins and Schwartz 
argue that both forms of oversight are appropriate and a preference for either kind does 
                                                 
64 U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 8, accessed 25 May 2012, http://constitution.org/constit_.htm. 
65 James Madison, “Federalist #51,” in The Federalist Papers, para. 6, accessed 25 May 2012,  
http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa51.htm  
66 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Congressional Oversight: An Overview, 
by Walter J. Oleszek, CRS Report R41079 (Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and 
Publishing, February 22, 2010). 
67 Oleszek, Congressional Oversight: An Overview, 9–14. 
68 Mathew D. McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police 
Patrols and Fire Alarms,” American Journal of Political Science 28, no. 1 (1984): 166.   
69 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms,” 
166. 
70  McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms,” 
166. 
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not imply that Congress is failing to supervise the executive.71  They argue that Congress 
simply prefers “fire alarm” oversight.72  Additionally, they state that previous scholars 
only focus on “police patrol” oversight when they assert that Congress is negligent in its 
duties.73  Although McCubbins and Schwartz present a compelling argument, they do not 
adequately address the idea that oversight should prevent executive abuses and failures in 
the first place. The most effective way to prevent error is a vigorous “police patrol” 
oversight policy. McCubbins and Schwartz may be correct in asserting that Congress is 
not negligent by conducting “fire alarm” oversight, however, it is not the best way to do 
business. In the case of homeland security, Congress has chosen to pursue “police patrol” 
policy first, and “fire alarm” policy by exception.  
Equally as important as the methods are the motivations for oversight. In his 
seminal 1974 work, Congress: The Electoral Connection, David R. Mayhew asserts that 
members of Congress are driven solely by their desires for re-election.74  Similar to the 
simplifying economic assumption that all investors are rational, Mayhew assumes that all 
members are “single-minded seekers of reelection.”75  He then goes on to examine what 
effect this assumption has on legislative activity. Three types of legislative activity he 
describes are “advertising,” “credit claiming,” and “particularized benefits.”76  While the 
first two activities are self-defining, the third activity refers to the benefits members of 
Congress bring to their constituencies.77  All three of these are activities are of particular 
interest to DHS oversight because homeland security efforts often span from the federal 
down to the local level. Therefore, any perceived benefits a locality receives, in the way 
of increased protection or federal funding, will shine favorably on their local member of 
                                                 
71 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms,” 
170. 
72 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms,” 
170. 
73 McCubbins and Schwartz, “Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols and Fire Alarms,” 
176. 
74 David R. Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).  
75 Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 5. 
76 Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 49–60. 
77 Mayhew, Congress: The Electoral Connection, 53. 
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Congress. A counter-argument that Mayhew does not address particularly well is that a 
member of Congress’ primary duty is in fact to represent his constituents, not 
continuously sacrifice their well-being for the greater good of the country. At some level 
a member of Congress must believe he or she is the best individual for the job, therefore 
it is in the best interest of his district or state to get re-elected. Additionally, the overall 
dynamics of differing regional needs, party politics, and idealism should balance out the 
election ambitions of members of Congress.      
In addition to electoral motivations, many scholars accuse members of Congress 
of being unwilling to give up their committee jurisdictions, resulting in “turf battles” for 
influence and authority. Diana Evans challenges both these assertions.78  She does not 
dispute that members of Congress may be interested in maintaining power; however, she 
writes they also work with and for other motivations, including public welfare.79  She 
demonstrates this point through a series of case studies in which members of Congress 
passed legislation that was detrimental to business for their primary lobbyists and 
campaign supporters.80  These officials did so to promote public welfare rather than to 
seek re-election or increase power.81  Evans’ arguments reinforce the current homeland 
security oversight structure. For example, food security falls under the umbrella of 
homeland security. Therefore, the agricultural committees in both the House and the 
Senate have a vested interest in how DHS plans to secure the food supply. Furthermore 
their interest cannot simply be attributed to a desire to retain power, their programmatic 
interest is clear in the name of the committee. 
C. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF DHS 
The House of Representatives enacted formal oversight mechanisms shortly after 
President Bush signed The Homeland Security Act of 2002. On January 7, 2003, prior to 
DHS’s March commencement of operations, the House established the Select Committee 
                                                 
78 Diana Evans, “Congressional Oversight and the Diversity of Member’s Goals,” Political Science 
Quarterly 109, no. 4 (1994): 670. 
79 Evans, “Congressional Oversight and the Diversity of Member’s Goals,” 670, 684. 
80 Evans, “Congressional Oversight and the Diversity of Member’s Goals,” 673–686. 
81 Evans, “Congressional Oversight and the Diversity of Member’s Goals,” 684. 
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on Homeland Security.82 House leadership announced nominations to the committee on 
February 12.83 Membership would consist of 50 representatives, with a breakdown of 27 
republicans and 23.84 This format held until the 2004 release of the 9/11 Commission 
Report after which the committee was elevated to permanent standing status on January 
4, 2005.85 Membership was reduced to 19 majority members and 14 minority members.86 
The House Appropriations Committee (HAC) also has a corresponding Homeland 
Security Subcommittee.87 Despite these changes many critics assert that the Homeland 
Security Committee lacks authority over many of the most important parts of DHS.         
In January 2003, the Senate initially gave DHS oversight responsibilities to the 
Governmental Affairs Committee.88 This temporary arrangement, similar to the House, 
was maintained until the release of the 9/11 Commission Report. The Senate also 
responded to the report’s call to create a “single principal point of oversight,” however, 
its changes were not as drastic as the House’s. DHS jurisdiction remained with the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, which was renamed the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee in January 2005.89 There are currently nine majority 
members, eight minority members and a corresponding Homeland Security 
                                                 
82 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security: A Fact Sheet, by Judy Schneider, CRS Report RS21431 (Washington, DC: Office of 
Congressional Information and Publishing, October 4, 2004), 1. 
83 Schneider, House Select Committee on Homeland Security: A Fact Sheet, 2. 
84 Schneider, House Select Committee on Homeland Security: A Fact Sheet, 2. 
85 Christopher Shays, “Congressional Oversight over Homeland Security and the Dynamics of 
Appropriation,” in Homeland Security Handbook, ed. David G. Kamien (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2006), 
277. 
86 Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, accessed September 29, 
2012, http://homeland.house.gov/about/membership. 
87 Homeland Security, The U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, accessed 
September 29, 2012,http://appropriations.house.gov/subcommittees/subcommittee/?IssueID=34797.  
88 History, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, accessed 
September 29, 2012, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/about/history. 
89 History, U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, accessed 
September 29, 2012. 
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Subcommittee on the Senate Appropriations Committee (SAC).90 Like its House 
counterpart, the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has 
authorizations authority for DHS. Unfortunately, also like the House, the Senate 
committee does not have oversight authority of several major operational elements of 
DHS. Table 3 contains the major operational elements of DHS and which congressional 
committees hold oversight jurisdiction over them: 
    Major Operational 
Element Senate Committee House Committee 
U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection 
Shared by Finance and Homeland 
Security/Governmental Affairs Shared with Ways and Means 
U.S Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement 
Shared by  Finance, Judiciary, 
Homeland Security/Governmental 
Affairs Shared with Judiciary 
U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services Judiciary Judiciary 
The Transportation 
Security Administration 
Commerce, Science and 
Transportation Homeland Security 
Federal Law Enforcement 
Training Center Judiciary Homeland Security91 
The Federal Emergency 
Management Agency Environment and Public Works 
Transportation And 
Infrastructure 
U.S. Coast Guard 




U.S. Secret Service Judiciary Homeland Security92 
Table 3.   Illustration of Overlapping Jurisdictions93 
                                                 
90 About the Committee, U.S. Senate Homeland Security And Governmental Affairs Committee, 
accessed September 29, 2012, http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/about; Subcommittee on Homeland Security, 
United States Senate Committee on Appropriations, accessed September 29, 2012, 
http://www.appropriations.senate.gov/sc-homeland-security.cfm  
91 The Rules of the House of Representatives is unclear on which committees have jurisdiction over the 
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC). House Homeland Security Committee has at least 
partial jurisdiction over FLETC, however, there are likely other committees that also claim jurisdiction. 
92 The Rules of the House of Representatives is unclear on which committees have jurisdiction over the 
Secret Service. House Homeland Security Committee has at least partial jurisdiction over the Secret 
Service, however, there are likely other committees that also claim jurisdiction. 
93 Table 3 created by author using information obtained from the following sources: U.S. Library of 
Congress, Congressional Research Service, S.Res. 445: Senate Committee Reorganization for Homeland 
Security and Intelligence Matters, Paul S. Rundquist and Christopher M. Davis, CRS Report R21955 
(Washington, DC: Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, February 22, 2010); United States 
Representatives, http://www.house.gov/;  United States Senate, http://www.senate.gov/; United States 
Senate, Senate Manual: Containing the Standing Rules, Orders, Laws, and Resolutions Affecting The 
Business of the United States Senate (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011).; United States House of 
Representatives, Rules of the House of Representatives (Washington, DC: GPO, 2011). 
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The legally mandated structure of DHS and the objectives of the department drive 
congressional oversight. After Congress passed the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPD) – 7 directing 
DHS to develop security programs in coordination with several other federal agencies.94 
DHS has expanded on the guidance issued in HSPD-7 to develop the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Within the NIPP, DHS assigns specific security 
responsibilities to eighteen different federal Sector Specific Agencies (SSAs).95 DHS 
serves primarily as a coordinator and sets standards for the nation’s homeland security 
efforts. The departments DHS coordinates with include but are not limited to: 
Department of Health and Human Services, Department of the Interior, Environmental 
Protection Agency, and the Department of Energy.96 Once again this illustrates the wide-
spread mission of DHS justifying its diverse congressional oversight structure. 
The Rules of the House of Representatives and the Senate Manual are the two 
primary documents that govern committee jurisdictions. In each of these documents 
committee jurisdictions are primarily defined by executive branch functions rather than 
agencies. The Senate Manual mentions several DHS agencies by name in Title I Sec 
46.b.97 It does so, however, to state that the Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee specifically does not have jurisdiction over TSA, FLETC, USCG, 
TSA, and USCIS.98 Additionally, customs and immigration are sub-divided by function 
in both the House and the Senate which effectively divides oversight of CBP and ICE 
between different several committees. For example, in the House, immigration is shared 
between the Homeland Security, Judiciary, and Financial Services Committees.99 It  
 
                                                 
94 President George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 7, 17 Dec 2003, accessed 
May 25, 2012, http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/laws/gc_1214597989952.shtm. 
95 Department of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan: Partnering to enhance 
protection and resiliency (Washington, DC, 2009), 3. 
96 President George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive – 7; Department of Homeland 
Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
97 Senate Manual, 46. 
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appears that dividing oversight of the executive by function, rather than agency, makes 
overlapping jurisdictions inevitable. On the other hand, overlapping jurisdictions is 
certainly better than having gaps.   
D. COMMON CRITIQUES OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY 
Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff vigorously attempted to reduce the 
overlapping jurisdictions in congressional oversight of DHS. His primary arguments are 
summarized in a September 4, 2007, letter to Representative Peter King, the ranking 
member of the House Committee on Homeland Security. Within the letter Chertoff 
summarizes the number of hearings, testimonies, briefings, and questions for record DHS 
has provided for Congress. He states the requests are “burdensome” and distract from 
“meeting operational mission demands.”100 Although there is no doubt that responding to 
congressional requests is time consuming, Chertoff does not give any specifics on tasks 
that were sacrificed to meet Congress’ demands. 
Perhaps the most quoted piece of government documentation regarding 
congressional oversight of homeland security is the 9/11 Commission Report. In addition 
to the recommendation for a “single, principal point of oversight,” the report calls for a 
single authorizing source for DHS.101 Research conducted for this thesis suggests that 
although DHS should not receive appropriations and authorizations from a variety of 
committees, delegating this responsibility to a single committee is impossible. Even the 
Department of Defense, with a much less diverse mission, answers to at least thirty-six 
congressional committees and subcommittees.102  
Almost all scholarly analysis of congressional oversight of the Department of 
Homeland Security asserts that the current structure is dysfunctional. Norman J. Ornstein 
and Thomas E. Mann state that although Congress demands several briefings a week, it 
                                                 
100 Secretary Michael Chertoff to Representative Peter King, September 4, 2007, Office of the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, accessed May 20, 2012, 
http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=683475. 
101 The 9/11 Commission Report, 421. 
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has failed to conduct any real oversight of homeland security. They argue that the House 
Committee on Homeland Security and the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs are “relative(ly) powerless.”103 Mann and Ornstein, however, state 
the problem pervades throughout Congress and is not limited to homeland security. In a 
more targeted piece, Patrick S. Roberts uses the homeland security granting process to 
demonstrate the dysfunctional nature of oversight.104 He argues that grant money is 
disproportionately issued to low risk areas and low probability problems such as 
terrorism.105 In contrast to Diana Evans’ argument, summarized above, Roberts cites 
“pork barrel spending” and “reelection ambitions” as the causes with little regard for 
other motives or measures.106 The problem with Robert’s argument is that he fails to 
acknowledge that the same criticism can be applied to other government programs such 
as defense, energy, and transportation, though he wants to single out homeland security 
as an example of a particularly poorly overseen organization.  
David Rittgers provides the harshest criticism of DHS, stating the department 
should be abolished.107 Among the reasons he cites are staggering bureaucracy, 
inefficiency, employee dissatisfaction, “pork barrel” spending, and invasion of civil 
liberties.108 Although these are all problems that DHS must address, abolishing the 
department is too rash. Homeland security is a mission common to many federal agencies 
and a coordinating lead agency is necessary. Despite DHS’s complex structure Congress 
must conduct effective oversight. A Booz Allen Hamilton report summarizing the 
management lessons of 9/11 notes that “the majority of people we interviewed felt the 
creation of the department was the right decision… (but) the merger initially resulted 
                                                 
103 Norman J. Orstein and Thomas E. Mann, “When Congress Checks Out,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6 
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mission overlaps and policy shortfalls, confused functional and operational roles.”109 The 
“mission overlaps” and confusion created by the structure of DHS is best quantitatively 
documented by Timothy Balunis and William Hemphill. Through the use of an index for 
jurisdictional clarity they demonstrate that DHS has the most fragmented congressional 
oversight in history.110 In their analysis they compare DHS to three other federal agencies 
with historically fragmented oversight: Defense, Transportation, and Energy.111 While it 
may be true that DHS may suffer from the most fragmented oversight, it is also hard to 
dispute that DHS has the most diverse mission of any federal agency. The authors 
address this issue attributing the diversity of DHS’s mission to the lack of a clear 
definition for homeland security.112     
A few broad underlying themes are apparent after a review of literature pertaining 
to homeland security. Although scholars and policy makers often refer to the number of 
hearings, briefings, testimonies, and reports DHS must prepare, they only focus on 
numbers and not the content. A second common theme is the authorizations and 
appropriations process. The arguments citing the disparate funding of DHS do carry 
merit. As the case study on the oversight of intelligence demonstrates in Chapter III, 
separate authorizations and appropriations provides executive branch agencies loopholes 
to exploit and circumvent oversight. Finally, what is notably absent from most literature 
is a discussion of how an agency with such widespread coordinating authority across the 
federal government could receive oversight from just one committee.        
E. CONCLUSION 
Even before the 9/11 attacks multiple expert panels recognized the necessity of a 
department designed to engage a changing post-Cold War environment. After the attacks 
the need for the agency became urgent and obvious. The federal government quickly 
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created DHS, loosely modeling it after recommendations made by the Hart-Rudman 
Commission. Since its initial creation the department has undergone multiple major 
reorganizations and its mission continues to grow. DHS’s mission has expanded from 
fighting terrorism to engaging “all hazards.” Congress’ oversight plan, however, has not 
undergone such rapid changes. Both the House and Senate divide jurisdiction of DHS 
agencies between several different committees. As a result, many scholars and journalists 
have doled out harsh criticism of the legislative branch. They asserted that Congress’ 
disparate oversight provides conflicting direction and creates unnecessary work for DHS. 
Critics fail to concede that Congress implements several tenets of strong oversight in its 
review of DHS activities.  
 
 27
III. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE 
(A Congressman) who had been dozing through the early part of a 
briefing, suddenly awoke and demanded to know ‘what the hell [the 
Agency] was doing in covert parliamentary operations.’ When it was 
explained that the chart in front of him referred to covert ‘paramilitary’ 
activities, he expressed his relief to the briefers, telling them they ‘don’t 
know enough about it [parliamentary activity]. . . to be fooling around 
with [it].’113 
Although there have been occasional bright spots in congressional oversight of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, the anecdote at the top of this chapter typifies how 
poorly Congress has generally handled its responsibilities. Its deficient oversight failed to 
prevent sabotaging of the democratic processes of other countries, infringements on 
domestic civil liberties, and violations of the U.S. Constitution. In most cases members of 
Congress were unable to thwart these activities because they were simply not aware they 
were occurring. From the birth of the modern intelligence community, starting with the 
passing of the National Security Act of 1947, Congress lacked the ability and the 
structure to conduct proper intelligence oversight. Congress’ statutes, formal procedures, 
and informal practices for intelligence oversight diminish rather than reinforce its explicit 
and implicit constitutional powers. 
A common argument proposed by the executive branch is the president is the sole 
executor of foreign policy, thus he and his agencies may conduct covert operations and 
intelligence collection efforts unfettered by Congress.114 An examination of the 
Constitution and the Federalist Papers demonstrates this is hardly true. Unfortunately 
congressional leaders of the 1940s and 1950s succumbed to pressure from the executive 
branch. They did not use effective oversight tools such as hearings, the GAO, and an IG 
because they thought they may be overstepping their bounds.115 Thus, they entered an 
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irreparable situation where they were unable to conduct oversight because they lacked the 
power to get information.116 The executive branch could withhold information citing 
secrecy as a reason and Congress was powerless to force its hand.  
A. BEFORE THE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEES: 1947–1976  
The National Security Act of 1947 transformed the Central Intelligence Group 
(CIG formed in 1946, in response to Pearl Harbor) into the modern day CIA.117 Whereas 
the CIG was an interdepartmental working group, the CIA became an independent 
establishment.118 The legislators who wrote the National Security Act of 1947 were 
primarily concerned with reforming the Department of Defense, therefore they paid little 
attention to Section 202, which established the CIA.119 Thus started a decades long trend 
of vague legislation that allowed the executive considerable latitude in its actions. The 
subsequent CIA Act of 1949 was the department’s true “enabling” legislation.120 As a 
result of the law, “the Agency would be able to expend funds without regard to the laws 
and regulations that governed the expenditure of government funds and, indeed, could 
account for those funds based solely on the certificate of the DCI.”121 For all practical 
purposes, by passing this legislation Congress forfeited its power of the purse. Through 
the authorizations and appropriations process Congress has significant impact on which 
programs are funded, how many employees an organization has, and what activities they 
can pursue. Without adhering to the normal accounting procedures the executive branch 
could allocate funds through the CIA however they saw fit. Lacking specific details on 
operations Congress could only influence policy by cutting the budget at large. This 
course of action was unlikely because most representatives and senators felt the CIA was 
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necessary.122 With both pieces of legislation, the two key issues were ambiguous 
language and expanding the authority of the executive while diminishing the power of the 
legislative. 
The CIA also declared itself immune to audits by the General Accounting Office 
(later renamed the Government Accountability Office).123 The Agency’s third Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI), “RADM Hillenkoetter had taken the position in 1948 that the 
Agency’s statutory authority to spend appropriated funds for operational purposes 
without the requirement of a ‘voucher’ - a document showing how the funds had been 
spent - in effect exempted such funds from audit by the GAO.”124 By weakening its 
power of the purse, Congress surrendered yet another extremely powerful oversight tool. 
The GAO is instrumental in identifying fraud, waste, abuse, illegal activity, and the 
general effectiveness of federal agencies.125 The issue of opening the CIA to GAO audits 
has risen periodically over last 65 years, but the Agency has been able to obstruct any 
such efforts.126  To this end, the CIA has cited both the statutory authority mentioned 
above and the need for secrecy.127 In regard to the secrecy argument, the GAO has access 
to the Department of Defense’s highly classified Special Access Programs (SAP) but still 
has limited access to the CIA’s operations.128 Chairman Rockefeller (D-West Virginia) 
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2007: “These programs are known to hundreds if not thousands of executive branch 
employees… only eight members of the legislative branch are trustworthy enough to 
know about them.”129  
In addition to the weak statutes, the formal CIA oversight procedures Congress 
enacted prior to 1976 were also ineffective. Until 1976, the House and Senate Armed 
Services Committees provided oversight for CIA operations, while intelligence 
appropriations were handled by the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees.130 A few key 
leaders on the HASC and SASC, coupled with the leaders of the Appropriations 
Committees, were the only ones who regularly interacted with the CIA.131 Most members 
of Congress had little to no involvement in overseeing the Agency.132 Additionally, the 
leaders of the HASC, SASC, HAC, and SAC were very busy individuals who were 
typically large proponents of the Agency and its operations.133 As a result, the CIA often 
received very little critical oversight.134  
During the first decade of the Agency’s existence, the SASC held roughly two 
hearings per year, and the SAC held around one hearing per year, on the CIA.135 Even 
when these hearings were held, the committee leaders failed to ask the tough questions. 
Former SASC Committee Chairmen, Senator Leverett Saltonstall’s (R-Massachusetts) 
famous quote regarding intelligence oversight emerged from this timeframe. When asked 
on the Senate floor if the CIA officials refused to answer any of his questions, he replied: 
“It is not a question of reluctance on the part of CIA officials to speak to us. Instead, it is 
a question of our reluctance, if you will, to seek information and knowledge on subjects 
which I personally, as a Member of Congress and as a citizen, would rather not have.”136 
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Unfortunately this attitude, coupled with a weak formal oversight structure, set very 
damaging precedents. By not demanding disclosure of the CIA’s activities while the 
organization was still in its infancy, Congress set the stage for the denying and hiding of 
information in the future. The executive branch was inclined to withhold information to 
protect its policy choices, and Congress failed to fight these tendencies.137 
As result of Congress’ reluctance to gather the information required to conduct 
effective oversight many intelligence abuses ensued. The 1972 Watergate scandal was the 
event that triggered an era of reform in the intelligence community.138 In preparation for 
the associated congressional hearings, Director of Central Intelligence James Schlesinger 
had the Agency prepare a document that is famously known as the “family jewels.”139 
The “family jewels” contained various details on sabotaging foreign democracies and 
domestic spying. The document was eventually leaked and published in Seymour Hersh’s 
article in The New York Times. The story contained details on flagrant violations of the 
Constitution such as wire-tapping the communications of U.S. citizens.140 Consequently, 
Congress formed the Church Committee (Senate) and the Pike Committee (House) to 
investigate these abuses. The findings of the Church and Pike Committees resulted in 
drastic changes in formal intelligence oversight procedures. The first significant statutory 
change in intelligence oversight, however, was already set for enactment prior Hersh’s 
story in the The New York Times.141  
The 1974 Hughes-Ryan Amendment passed eight days after the “family jewels” 
became front-page news.142 Congress proposed the law after they learned of the CIA’s 
operations that involved interference with domestic politics in Chile.143 The law 
mandated that all covert operations must be approved by a presidential “finding.”144 
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Additionally, the Armed Services Committees, Appropriations Committees, and Foreign 
Affairs Committees must all be informed of these findings.145 Although the Hughes-Ryan 
Amendment was a step in the correct direction, like earlier legislation, it was also too 
vague and left ample room for intelligence abuses. The executive branch subsequently 
exploited the fact that there was no time frame associated with reporting, that the findings 
did not have to be in writing, and that they did not need to be in advance.146 Congress’ 
statutory measures still lacked the power to force the disclosure of intelligence activities.    
The results of the Church and Pike Committees’ findings prompted the creation of 
the SSCI and the House Permanent Select Committees on Intelligence (HPSCI). For the 
first time a group of members of Congress would have intelligence oversight as their 
primary duty. The committee’s primary responsibilities included creating an Intelligence 
Authorization Bill, the first of which passed in 1979.147 Appropriating authority, 
however, remained with the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and the intelligence 
budget would remain hidden within the defense budget.148 With this arrangement the 
intelligence committees still lacked the power to get information from the CIA, as the 
intelligence community could circumvent them and get funding from the Appropriations 
Committees.149  
Finally, the informal practices that arose during this early period have also 
inhibited the disclosure of information crucial to proper oversight. The “Gang of Four” 
notification procedure first came into practice prior to the establishment of the 
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intelligence committees.150 This procedure, not formalized in any statute, is utilized to 
notify congressional leaders of intelligence activity other than covert action.151 The 
individuals notified are limited to the committee chairmen and ranking members.152 By 
accepting this practice early in the life of the Agency, congressional leaders once again 
set a damaging precedent. It is impossible for just a few extremely busy members of 
Congress to have the expertise required to process detailed and sensitive intelligence 
information.153 Notification should be as widespread as possible without compromising 
national security. In many cases these leaders were unable to bring their staff “or even 
discuss” the information with each other after they left the briefing.154 Without the use of 
their staff’s expertise, or the benefits of collaboration with their colleagues, members do 
not even know the correct questions to ask.155  
Additionally, by not raising immediate objections the individuals present in the 
briefing are now complicit in the executive branch’s actions.156 Finally, based on past 
dialogue of leaders privy to these briefings, the intelligence officials do not always place 
the appropriate emphasis on important items.157 Therefore, it is easy for a congressman 
with a multitude of competing interests to miss vital information. Congressional leaders 
should have, at the minimum, required the CIA to inform the whole SASC and HASC 
committees and their staffs.158 Disclosure to the entire body of Congress may be  
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impractical, however, limiting information to four individuals makes it difficult for those 
persons to take any action.159 The “Gang of Four” has very little recourse to act on 
intelligence information they receive.     
B. THROUGH THE END OF THE COLD WAR: 1976–1991 
The first major piece of intelligence oversight legislation produced after the 
creation of the intelligence committees was the FY 1980 Intelligence Authorization Act. 
The law made significant changes to the covert action reporting requirements formalized 
in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974. Presidential findings now only had to be 
reported to the House and Senate intelligence committees versus the six committees 
previously mentioned.160 Additionally, the other major provisions stated that the entire 
intelligence community, not just the CIA, must keep the HPSCI and SSCI informed in a 
“timely fashion.”161 The act did not define “timely fashion” nor did it specify that 
findings must be written.162 The provisions sought to rectify Congress’ lack of 
information in conducting strong oversight, however, it was too vague and again it did 
not give Congress any power to enforce.163 It failed to prevent the Iran-Contra scandal, 
which began to unfold only a year later. 
In 1981 the Reagan administration started providing aid to the rebel Contras in 
Nicaragua.164 Congress disapproved of this policy and passed the Boland II Amendment, 
which forbade any such assistance.165 In 1985, Lebanese terrorists hijacked an American 
flight to Beirut.166 Simultaneously, the National Security Council (NSC) was brokering 
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an arms deal to improve relations with Iran.167 Once President Reagan learned of the deal, 
he determined that selling arms to Iran may help negotiate the release of the hostages by 
the “pro-Iranian” terrorists.168 This was, however, in direct violation of the U.S.’s “no 
negotiations for hostages” policy.169 Additionally, the NSC violated the Boland II 
Amendment by using the proceeds from the arms sales to once again aid the Contras in 
Nicaragua.170 The operation was exposed in 1986 after Nicaragua’s Sandinista 
government shot down a CIA re-supply plane and a Lebanese magazine exposed the 
arms-for-hostages dealings.171  
On November 21, 1986, Congress began investigations into the Iran-Contra 
scandal and discovered numerous intelligence community abuses.172 Hughes-Ryan had 
introduced the requirement for a presidential finding but did not require it be written, 
resulting in several conflicting testimonies on what operations President Reagan knew 
about or ordered during Iran-Contra.173  In one particular instance President Reagan 
claimed that he denied approving a specific arms sale, while National Security Advisor 
(NSA) Robert C. McFarlane testified the president did approve the exact same arms 
sale.174 A CIA plane flew arms to Iran without the approval of Deputy CIA Director John 
McMahon or a presidential finding.175 To repair the damage, CIA general counsel Stanley 
Sporkin drafted presidential findings that retroactively approved the flights.176  Finally,  
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numerous executive branch officials including Alan Fiers (CIA Chief of the Central 
America Task Force) and Elliott Abrams (Assistant Secretary of State) were caught lying 
under oath during the investigation.177  
The results of the investigation prompted the FY 1991 Intelligence Authorization 
Act.178 A summary of the major changes regarding covert action are as follows: findings 
for authorizing covert actions must be in writing and in advance; Congress must be 
notified in advance; if advance notice is not possible, the president must notify Congress 
in a “timely fashion”; and covert actions may not violate the Constitution or other U.S. 
laws.179 Finally, Congress included the first official definition of covert action in the act: 
“an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, 
economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United 
States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly.”180 Conference 
language accompanying the initial bill stated that “timely fashion” was intended to mean 
“within a few days.”181  
President George H.W. Bush vetoed this version and Congress passed a newer 
version with different conference language that removed the “within a few days” 
intent.182 Although this statute strengthened intelligence community reporting 
requirements, it still did not provide Congress with sufficient access to information. The 
president still has the authority to determine what constitutes a “timely fashion” and 
ultimately withhold information if he deems necessary. President Bush issued the 
following signing statement in conjunction with the FY 1991 Intelligence Authorization 
Act that affirmed the above executive prerogatives: 
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Several provisions in the Act requiring the disclosure of certain 
information to the Congress raise Constitutional concerns. These 
provisions cannot be construed to detract from the President’s 
constitutional authority to withhold information the disclosure of which 
could significantly impair foreign relations, the national security, the 
deliberative processes of the executive, or the performance of 
constitutional duties.183    
Despite Bush’s claim that the Act may be infringing on the constitutional 
authority of the executive, many of the statutory reporting requirements regarding covert 
action intelligence activity are in place because the executive branch violated U.S. laws 
and the Constitution. In fact, the executive branch violated the Constitution and U.S. laws 
so many times that Congress actually felt compelled to pass a law saying they cannot 
violate the Constitution (FY 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act). Most historical 
examples of intelligence community abuses demonstrate that the executive branch sought 
to conceal intelligence activity that was of questionable legal or moral nature. The 
leadership most likely deemed the activity absolutely necessary, but felt that Congress 
may disapprove of these actions.184 Therefore, the executive branch withheld, or 
selectively conveyed, information to avoid scrutiny of the policy decisions.185   
Despite all the reforms implemented in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal, 
Congress still lacked the ability to force disclosure of intelligence activity. Funding 
procedures did not change and the statutory language remained vague. Congress was 
correct in its first version of the bill to mandate notification “within a few days.” By 
removing this conference language the executive branch kept the ability to define “timely 
fashion.” Congress should have overridden the veto and mandated specific reporting 
requirements. With a more precise requirement it would be clear when the president 
violated the statute. “Within a few days” is still a vague time frame; however, it is much 
more specific than a “timely fashion.”  
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The single strong reform that resulted from the Iran-Contra scandal was the 
implementation of a statutory Inspector General.186 The CIA has had an IG since 1952, 
though the position was appointed by the Director.187 The CIA Inspector General Act of 
1989 created an IG who would be “appointed by the president and confirmed by the 
Senate, and who could only be removed by the president. The IG would report to, and be 
under the “general supervision” of, the DCI but would have authority to carry out 
investigations, audits, and inspections of his or her choosing.”188 Congress finally 
implemented at least one change that may give it access to unbiased and complete 
information.      
C. PRESENT ISSUES: 1991–2012 
With the exceptions of the Aldrich Ames case and the National Reconnaissance 
Office budget fiasco, most of the 1990s remained free from intelligence scandals.189 After 
the 9/11 tragedy, however, intelligence activity once again increased which in turn 
resulted in more controversy. Enhanced interrogations and warrant-less electronic 
surveillance are two of the predominant issues. In both these cases, unlike many instances 
in the past, the executive branch did notify Congress prior to the stories leaking to the 
press.190 Congress’ inability to effect policy is highlighted in both cases. The procedures 
and statutes they have in place are simply not strong enough to effect any change in 
policy. In 2002, Congressional leaders were notified of enhanced interrogation techniques 
through confidential “Gang of Four”-style briefings and were sworn to secrecy.191 They 
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were not able to consult their expert staff or other members of the Intelligence 
Committees.192 The only member who was on record raising an objection with the CIA 
was Representative Jane Harmon (D-California).193  
Members of Congress were also aware of the administration’s warrant-less 
wiretapping activities prior to the story becoming public.194 In 2003, chairman of the 
SSCI, Senator Rockefeller (D-West Virginia) expressed concerns about the program in a 
written letter to Vice President Cheney, however, the administration continued 
monitoring electronic surveillance without a warrant.195 The Bush Administration’s 
warrant-less wiretapping was first publicized in The New York Times in December 
2005.196 In 2007, after considerable public debate, the Bush Administration began 
conducting surveillance in accordance with FISA.197 In both cases Congress alone was 
not powerful enough to invoke change in policy. Changes only occurred after the cases 
became public.    
The 9/11 Commission Report labeled congressional oversight of intelligence 
“dysfunctional.”198 Among its recommendations were to create a joint committee and 
combine authorizations and appropriations authority.199 Congress has not implemented 
either of these recommendations. There are numerous advantages and disadvantages to 
the joint committee model.200 Discussing all the pros and cons is outside the scope of this  
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thesis. However, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy was often cited as being 
extremely powerful and thus a similar model may assist Congress in achieving stronger 
intelligence oversight.201   
Congress has taken some minor steps to synchronize authorizations and 
appropriations. In 2007, the Senate issued a Memorandum of Agreement between the 
Intelligence and Appropriations Committees that sought to improve coordination between 
the two bodies.202 These measures include: 
 Notify staff and allow them to attend the intelligence hearings of the other 
body. 
 Allow each Intelligence Committee member who is also an appropriator to 
bring his or her intelligence staff members to Appropriations Committee 
hearings and markups. 
 Permit all senators and cleared staff of one committee to review the bill, 
report, and classified annex of the other before action is taken. 
 (Give) the chairmen and ranking minority members of each committee the 
opportunity to appear before the other panel to present their views prior to 
the markup of either the intelligence authorization or appropriations 
bills.203 
Additionally, as of 2011, the House has three appropriators that sit on the Intelligence 
Committee.204 Both of these options fall well short of combining authorizations and 
appropriations. Intelligence agencies are still able to maneuver around the intelligence 
committees and get funding direct from the Appropriations Committees.205 
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D. CONCLUSION 
The causal factors identified in Congress’ failure to oversee intelligence are as 
follows: 
1. Setting a damaging precedent of weak oversight in the early years of the CIA 
2. Lack of formal oversight structure for first two decades 
3. Legislation 
a. Vague 
b. Empowers executive branch vice legislative branch 
c. Reduces checks and balances intended by Founding Fathers 
4. Power of the purse diminished 
a. CIA not required to account for expenditures 
b. Authorization process circumvented 
5. Surrendering, or failing to utilize, other legislative oversight methods 
  
The history of intelligence abuses in the United States clearly demonstrates that 
without checks and balances, government agencies will abuse their power. Therefore, any 
statutes that Congress passes should reinforce and not diminish its constitutional powers. 
Congress must make its legislation specific so violations are easy to detect. 
Congressional oversight of intelligence has made progress over the past 65 years. 
Unfortunately, the practices, procedures, and statutes enacted during the formative years 
of the CIA harmed Congress’ ability to provide adequate oversight. Representatives and 
senators must ensure that every federal agency is subject to the same checks and 
balances. An agency like the CIA is absolutely necessary for national security and has 
made tremendous contributions to the freedom of the United States. Constitutional 
principles and values, however, should not be sacrificed in the process.  











IV. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF DEFENSE 
In contrast to the poor oversight of the CIA, Congress has been largely successful 
in overseeing the Department of Defense. Compared to intelligence there have been very 
few major scandals and defense shortcomings. Experts and scholars may still point to 
flaws or inefficiencies in the defense oversight process. Of these limited issues, however, 
none compare in severity or scope to the multiple intelligence abuses discussed in the 
previous chapter. Senators and representatives take an active role in shaping the armed 
forces and defense policy. The question of whether Congress influenced defense policy in 
the right or wrong direction has an inherently subjective answer.206 Once policy is set in 
a certain direction, it is impossible to know whether an alternative course of action would 
have yielded acceptable or better results. The primary goal of this chapter is not to 
evaluate Congress’ policies but to demonstrate that through its oversight tools it has made 
an impact on national defense. In some of the following examples, however, this thesis 
highlights the positive influences Congress has made on defense policy. In any case, 
using the oversight of the CIA as a reference, active congressional involvement yields 
better results than lack of oversight.   
A. NATIONAL SECURITY ACT OF 1947–VIETNAM WAR: 
STRENGTHENING THE POWER OF THE PURSE   
Congress had an immediate advantage in oversight of defense that they did not 
have in intelligence: a formal oversight structure. The Legislative Reorganization Act of 
1946 established the modern Armed Services Committees that are present in both the 
House and Senate today.207 These committees, however, were not an innovation of the 
1946 reorganization of Congress. Prior to 1946, the House and Senate had a Military 
Affairs Committee and a Naval Affairs Committee.208 Overseeing the operations of the 
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military establishment was not a new endeavor for Congress. What was new, however, 
was the emphasis placed on systematic oversight of the executive branch. The Special 
Committee on the Organization of Congress’ report that accompanied Senate Resolution 
2177 (what became the Legislative Reorganization Act) stated the following:  
A third group of provisions in the bill is designed to strengthen 
congressional surveillance of the execution of the laws by the executive 
branch…We often delegate the rule-making power to administrative 
departments and commissions, without making any provision for follow-
up to see if administrative rules and regulations are in accord with the 
intent of the law…To remedy this situation, S. 2177 would authorize the 
standing committees of both Houses to exercise continuous surveillance of 
the execution of the laws by the administrative agencies within their 
jurisdiction.209          
Congressional committees now had the legally- mandated responsibility and authority to 
oversee agencies within the executive branch. Additionally, they had “subpoena power” 
to call witnesses forward during hearings.210 The statutory authority of the Armed 
Services Committees set an early precedent for strong oversight of DoD. In contrast, 
oversight of the CIA was relegated to subcommittees of the HASC/SASC whose 
authorities were much “less formal.”211  
Following World War II, President Truman was intent on reducing the large 
federal deficit. Part of the deficit reduction plan involved capping defense spending at 
$15 billion per year, which would significantly reduce World War II force levels.212 In 
the early days of DoD, unlike their tentativeness regarding intelligence matters, members 
of Congress were not hesitant to question this military spending decision or other defense 
policies. Members were not tentative about asserting the legislative branch’s 
constitutional authorities over the armed services. During FY 1947 budget deliberations, 
                                                 
209 Special Committee on the Organization of Congress Conference Report to accompany the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,  Pub. L. No. 29–401, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 5, 1946), 6. 
210 Special Committee on the Organization of Congress Conference Report to accompany the 
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946,  Pub. L. No. 29–401, 79th Cong., 2nd Sess. (March 5, 1946), 6. 
211 Legislative Oversight of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, accessed Oct. 14 2012,  
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/additional-publications/the-work-of-a-nation/intelligence-
oversight/legislative-oversight-of-intelligence.html. 
212 Edward A. Kolodziej, The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945–1963 (Columbus: Ohio State 
University Press, 1966), 38. 
 45
Representative Carl Vinson (D-Georgia) stated in opposition to the Truman 
Administration’s plan to cut back the U.S. Navy: “It is up to the American Congress to 
say what shall constitute the United States Navy.”213   
Although war in Korea made it impossible to maintain this $15 billion cap, the 
executive branch still sought to emphasize fiscal restraint. In the face of a growing Soviet 
threat and communist expansion many legislators openly questioned the wisdom of these 
reductions. After President Eisenhower took office congressional critics were equally 
critical of his “New Look” defense strategy, which favored technology over 
manpower.214 For example, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Air Force blamed 
Eisenhower’s policies for the waning power of the U.S. Air Force compared to that of the 
Soviet Union’s.215  Much of the 1940s and 1950s were marked by a legislative-executive 
rivalry centered on the budget and force allocation. The executive branch sought to 
reduce defense spending, exercise fiscal responsibility, and rely more on technology and 
less on conventional forces. Congress, on the other hand, looked to increase force levels, 
modernize equipment, and expand research and development. Many early budget 
confrontations ended with executive victories, but events in the mid to late 1950s 
prompted Congress to introduce legislation that enhanced its authority.216      
In 1956, the SASC identified what they viewed as a duplication of efforts between 
the Army and the Air Force. The Army had sought to fund a Nike missile system to 
provide defense of certain areas within the continental United States. Concurrently, the 
Air Force looked to fund Talos, which was also a point defense missile system. In 
reviewing these requests, the SASC inquired why both the systems were necessary. It 
appeared as if the systems provided overlapping coverage, wasting precious defense 
funds that could be better allocated to other programs. Both the Army and the Air Force 
defended their systems, and neither service could provide an adequate answer to 
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Congress. As a result, the Senate deleted the provision for the Talos system in its version 
of the military construction authorization bill. The House allowed the Talos system on the 
condition that the Secretary of Defense provides an answer to Congress as to why both 
systems were necessary. The president received and vetoed the House version of the bill. 
In retaliation, Congress pulled the funding for Talos and overrided the president’s 
veto.217       
The “Nike-Talos dispute” was only one of several disagreements between 
services Congress mediated in the late 1950s.218 As Thomas McNaugher wrote in his 
article, “Weapons Procurement: The Futility of Reform,” “The Eisenhower era remains 
widely known for the furious interservice competition it spawned by holding a lid on 
defense spending while focusing the nation’s procurement effort on nuclear weapons and 
delivery vehicles.”219 These disagreements paved the way for Armed Services 
Committees to get more involved in oversight of defense.220 The legislative branch did 
not defer to the executive like it had done in intelligence oversight. Instead, lawmakers 
maintained their power of the purse through strong accounting procedures and sought to 
eliminate waste while improving defense. They ensured funds were spent appropriately 
and efficiently. Congress strengthened rather than diminished its voice in defense 
matters.     
The first action Congress took to formalize its stronghold on the power of the 
purse was passing the Russell Amendment to the Military Construction Authorization 
Act for FY1960. The act stated: 
No funds may be appropriated after December 31, 1960, to or for the use 
of any armed force of the United States for the procurement of aircraft, 
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missiles, or naval vessels unless the appropriation of such funds has been 
authorized by legislation enacted after such date.221  
This bill was the foundation of the extensive defense authorization process that exists 
today.222 Although this bill on the surface appears as a purely budgetary measure it has 
strong implications for policy as well. Funding dictates the types of equipment, force 
levels, and research and development agendas for the armed services. The composition of 
the military effects the development of war plans and foreign policy. By shaping the 
structure of the military the legislative branch is in effect driving which military 
objectives the executive branch can and cannot pursue. 
The Russell Amendment was instrumental in establishing systematic and rigorous 
oversight through annual budget review. This is the type of oversight that McCubbins and 
Schwartz would deem “police patrol” oversight.223  Every year the Department of 
Defense must justify its expenses by providing Congress ample information to oversee 
the executive branch. Additionally, most of the defense budget is accessible to the entire 
legislative branch. Some critics assert that the process has led to Congressional “micro-
management” of defense.224 For example, one critic wrote, “Members and staff seem 
anxious to control every detail: the fit of fatigues, the price of hammers, the brand of 
tools, even the allocation of overhead costs to the price of spare parts.”225 However, a 
comparison between oversight of defense and intelligence demonstrates that the power of 
the purse is critical in conducting systematic oversight. Money gives Congress systematic 
leverage to obtain information.226 Once they relinquish that power it has forfeited its 
ability to conduct police patrol oversight. 
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The missile debates of the 1950s, and the passing of the Russell Amendment, also 
support Diana Evans’ assertion that electoral considerations are not always primary 
motivator for members of Congress.227 Changes like cancelling the Talos missile 
program and the Russell Amendment were instituted to control government spending. 
This in turn meant lower expenditures in various areas throughout the country and that 
undoubtedly meant some members of Congress’ constituents and supporters lost money, 
which is often bad news for re-election goals. Therefore, it is logical that the missile 
defense argument was settled in an effort to positively affect the greater public welfare. 
Correspondingly, critics often claim that lack of electoral payoff is a major contributor to 
poor intelligence oversight.228 Although this argument carries some merit, it does not 
fully explain ineffective oversight of the CIA. As demonstrated by defense oversight, 
legislators do not always require electoral payoff to engage in effective oversight. They 
do, however, require the formal processes and the authority to implement these 
procedures. Defense oversight has these processes and also provides congressman 
electoral benefits. Intelligence oversight does not carry as pronounced electoral benefits 
therefore the formal procedures are even more important.       
B. VIETNAM WAR-GOLDWATER-NICHOLS: STRENGTHENING THE 
OVERSIGHT OF OPERATIONS 
To be sure, not all congressional oversight of defense has been successful. The 
Vietnam War represents a large failure on the part of Congress. The legislative branch 
failed because they strayed from the tenets of strong oversight they normally exercise in 
defense oversight. The undeclared war was unpopular with the American public and 
Congress failed to react in a timely manner. It took eight years for Congress to invoke its 
power of the purse to express its constituents’ disapproval of the executive branch’s 
actions. In 1972, the Senate finally voted, 49–47, to pull funding for operations in 
Southeast Asia.229 The House, on the other hand, was never able to get a positive vote to 
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end the war.230 The executive branch had effectively circumvented Congress’ 
constitutional authority to declare war. To prevent similar occurrences in the future 
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution in 1973. 
The major requirements of the War Powers Resolution are: 
 Inform Congress before committing troops into hostilities.  
 Within 48 hours submit a report to Congress detailing the involvement. 
 Withdraw troops after 60 days unless Congress specifically authorizes the 
operations to continue. 231    
The War Powers Resolution is an example of poor fire alarm oversight and a marked 
departure from Congress’ norm. The clauses in the War Powers Resolution are strangely 
similar to the covert action reporting requirements outlined in the previous chapter and 
have had little effect on executive branch operations over the past 39 years.232 Congress 
placed all responsibility for action on the president to inform the legislative branch and 
then take the initiative to withdraw troops without further authorization. Additionally, 
Congress has very little recourse if the president fails to follow the War Powers 
Resolution. Congress should have constructed the Act to be proactive police patrol 
legislation rather than reactive fire alarm legislation. Authorization should be required in 
advance for troop deployments above a predetermined level.233 Congress’ greatest 
successes in overseeing the defense establishment have come influencing future decisions 
rather than attempting to overturn past decisions.   
C. GOLDWATER-NICHOLS-PRESENT: MAINTAINING RIGOROUS 
OVERSIGHT  
Congress returned to its tradition of strong DoD oversight through the 
implementation of The Goldwater Nichols Act. The Iran hostage rescue attempt and other 
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small military operations such as Grenada exposed the armed services weakness in joint 
operations. Following these failures, the White House neglected to correct the 
incompatibility between services prompting Congress to take action.234 In 1986, 
Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act, which emphasized joint operations in the 
military. Incentives to joint assignments were introduced and the status of the joint staff 
was elevated. Officers had to complete a joint assignment for promotion to the rank of 
flag officer.235 Additionally, like many other successful legislative defense oversight 
initiatives, Goldwater-Nichols utilized proactive and effective oversight tools such as the 
authorizations and confirmation processes. The major changes include:  
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) became the principal 
military advisor to the president.  
 Chairman of the JCS, and the newly created Vice Chairman position are 
both appointed by president and confirmed by Senate.  
 The Chairman of the JCS outranks all other officers, however, he does not 
exercise military command over them. 
 Joint Duty is required for promotion to flag officer.236 
 
The size and composition of the Joint Staff is authorized by Congress, which inherently 
allows the legislative branch a certain measure of control. Additionally, Congress very 
skillfully incorporated its confirmation powers into Goldwater-Nichols.237 Because the 
Senate confirms both the JCS and his Vice Chairman, the president must appoint 
someone who will pass the confirmation process.238 Congress has now constrained the 
president’s choice to someone who is sympathetic to the legislative branch’s concerns.239 
Furthermore, all flag officers must be approved by legislative branch. Accordingly, 
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Congress mandated that every flag officer candidate must have a joint tour. Since 
Congress controls the confirmation process they can ensure this procedure is followed. 
Previously, services kept their best officers and sent their mediocre performers to joint 
assignments.240 After Goldwater-Nichols, services had to send their best officers to joint 
assignments to make them eligible for promotion to flag ranks.241   
The Goldwater-Nichols example also demonstrates that Congress takes its 
oversight responsibilities seriously despite a lack of traditional incentives. As Vincent 
Davis wrote in “Reorganization and National Security,” “Goldwater-Nichols was unique 
in many other respects. For one thing, it was the only major defense reorganization that 
did not receive significant media coverage and that even as of late 1990 had received 
virtually no attention from the academic community of defense specialists.”242 The lack 
of media coverage indicates that legislators received minimal electoral payoff from 
reforming the armed services. Once again, this supports Evans’ assertion that electoral 
considerations are not always members’ of Congress primary motivations. Given the 
proper process and authority, legislators will effect changes to benefit the welfare of the 
country without seeking personal reward. Additionally, as James R. Locher writes in 
Victory on the Potomac, “There was never a hint of executive-legislative competition, 
partisan politics, or concern about who got the credit.”243 Congressman will cut across 
party lines and put aside electoral considerations to effect enduring change.   
Congress continues to weigh in on a multitude of issues affecting the Department 
of Defense. The F-22 debate is one such high-profile issue that Congress and the 
executive branch have dealt with over the past few years. In 2009, President Obama and 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates requested from Congress that F-22 production be 
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halted at 187 planes rather than the 381 originally requested.244 The initial reaction from 
the legislative branch was highly unfavorable. Many representatives and senators 
immediately complained about the numerous jobs that would be lost from discontinuing 
production of the Raptor, and one report noted, “200 members of the House and 
44 members of the Senate have signed letters to President Obama urging him to extend 
the $62 billion F-22 Raptor program.”245  Additionally, many supporters from local 
governments around the country wrote the federal government to keep the program.246 In 
the end, however, Congress voted to halt the program. Based on budget constraints, 
keeping the F-22 meant many other valuable programs would have to be cut.247 
Additionally, the Raptor fills a niche capability unmatched by any other country in the 
world. In the future it may be wise to reopen the line, however, Congress made the 
correct decision based on present circumstances.   
Congress once again made a decision that was vitally important to national 
security without making personal gain its sole concern. Undoubtedly there were 
individuals within Congress who were concerned with how the cancellation of the F-22 
program would serve their electoral interests. Additionally, there were likely members of 
Congress who genuinely believed that cancelling the Raptor program was not in the best 
interests of the country. However, Congress was able to collectively come to the correct 
decision. Finally, this decision was particularly notable because, like Goldwater-Nichols, 
it was bipartisan in nature. President Obama and his 2008 presidential opponent, Senator  
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John McCain (R-Arizona), both advocated cutting the program.248 The legislative branch 
is capable of cutting across party lines and making the right decision when it comes to 
matters of national security.    
D. CONCLUSION 
There are numerous other examples of strong congressional oversight of the 
Department of Defense not included in this chapter. Congress has a history of assertive 
oversight that has had pronounced influence on the United States’ national security 
policies. A formal structure to oversee DoD was in place at the inception of the 
department. Senators and representatives immediately set a precedent of significant 
congressional involvement in defense matters. Both the DoD and the president came to 
expect congressional participation. Additionally, lawmakers passed legislation such as 
the Russell Amendment that enhanced rather than diminished their power of the purse. 
Congress’ monetary power over defense gave them the leverage to get information and 
make decisions. Furthermore, with few exceptions the legislative branch predominantly 
implemented police patrol rather than fire-alarm oversight. Its systematic oversight of 
defense prevented the major scandals that have plagued intelligence for the last 65 years. 
Finally, defense oversight is principally criticized for being too overbearing and plagued 
with “pork-barrel” motivations. The examples in this chapter show that these accusations 
are misleading. There have been several examples where Congress has overcome the 
provincial motivations of individual members of Congress to promote greater national 
security. 
The critiques of congressional oversight of the DoD and DHS are strikingly 
similar. In 1985, one Pentagon official stated “that over 90 percent of his staff must focus 
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action.”249 In 1982, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger made 16 appearances before 
Congress.250 The following year he made 20 appearances.251 In 2011, current Secretary of 
DHS Janet Napolitano made just 11 appearances.252 Finally, in 1983, defense witnesses 
testified before 96 different congressional committees.253 Therefore, it appears that 
DHS’s perceived problems are neither new nor isolated to homeland security. 
Critics assert that this level of scrutiny equates to micromanagement on the part of 
Congress. The alternative is implementing procedures similar to those used in oversight 
of the CIA. Congress could alter its procedures to provide DoD broad financial 
authorizations, request minimal financial reporting, remove the Inspector General and 
cancel GAO audits. Additionally, the legislative branch could passively allow the 
executive branch to withhold information and only report to selected individuals on 
DoD’s terms. The result would be oversight analogous to that of the pre-9/11 intelligence 
community. The history of executive abuse of power implemented through the CIA 
attests that more oversight is better. The line between effective oversight and 
micromanagement can be thin, but evidence confirms that erring on the side of 
micromanagement is the lesser of two evils.            
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V. FINAL COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSION 
This chapter uses the data from the previous three chapters to compare and 
contrast congressional oversight of DHS, the CIA, and DoD. The legislative branch has 
historically been unsuccessful in preventing several major intelligence abuses over the 
past sixty-five years. Congress has, however, demonstrated strong oversight of DoD 
during the same time frame. This thesis demonstrates that congressional oversight of 
homeland security more closely resembles defense oversight rather than intelligence 
oversight. 
Measuring success is somewhat difficult for homeland security. DHS has a broad 
mission ranging from border patrol to disaster response. Additionally, when evaluating 
disaster response to events such as Hurricane Katrina it is impossible to be fast enough or 
effective enough. There is never an acceptable amount of loss of life or property. Using 
the efficacy of counterterrorism efforts is one useful way to objectively evaluate DHS’s 
performance over the last ten years. Despite DHS’s broad mission, it was originally 
established with a primary mission of defending America.254 Before 9/11, from 1991 to 
2000, the United States averaged more than 41 terrorist attacks per year.255 In the time 
period 2002–2008, the number of terrorist attacks dropped to 16 per year.256 
Additionally, during the same time periods terror related deaths dropped from 217 to just 
25, 13 of which are attributed to the Fort Hood shootings.257 Some of the success in 
deterring terrorism is obviously attributable to the heightened awareness following 9/11 
and the efforts of other federal agencies. Nonetheless, it would be unfair for critics to 
discount the efforts of DHS. Therefore, at the very least, Congress’ robust oversight of 
homeland security has not impeded DHS in accomplishing its mission.     
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A. SYSTEMATIC VERSUS REACTIONARY OVERSIGHT 
Congress plays an extremely important role in the success or failure of executive 
agencies. Regardless of whether the legislative branch is overseeing DoD, DHS or the 
CIA it is generally attempting to accomplish the following objectives: 
 Improve the efficiency, economy, and effectiveness of governmental 
operations. 
 Evaluate programs and performance. 
 Detect and prevent poor administration, waste, abuse, arbitrary and 
capricious behavior, or illegal and unconstitutional conduct. 
 Protect civil liberties and constitutional rights. 
 Inform the general public and ensure that executive policies reflect the 
public interest. 
 Gather information to develop new legislative proposals or to amend 
existing statutes. 
 Ensure administrative compliance with legislative intent. 
 Prevent executive encroachment on legislative authority and 
prerogatives.258 
Every one of these objectives is better accomplished through rigorous and systematic 
police patrol oversight rather than reactionary fire-alarm oversight. It is impossible to 
“evaluate programs,” ensure compliance, or “detect and prevent poor administration” 
through passive oversight. Prevention, protection, and improvement all imply a proactive 
approach to oversight. Proactivity, in turn, requires the legislative branch to obtain 
information from the executive branch. Information is obtained through regularly 
scheduled hearings, reports, briefings, and various other methods. Although DHS finds 
Congress’ requests for information burdensome, they are absolutely necessary to achieve 
the objectives listed above. A failure to systematically gather information would result in 
reverting to fire-alarm oversight. As demonstrated by oversight of intelligence, fire-alarm 
oversight should not be the primary oversight method. Fire-alarm oversight is, however, 
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an excellent secondary method. If despite rigorous police patrol oversight abuses or 
failures occur in the executive branch, Congress must investigate and repair the causes.  
Without formal processes and legal authorities the legislative branch cannot 
conduct systematic oversight. The CIA and DoD had two vastly different oversight 
structures that produced very different results. The CIA was initially overseen by a single 
small subcommittee that hardly held any hearings. The Department of Defense received 
oversight from two very powerful standing committees and defense issues received 
attention throughout Congress. While the rigor of homeland security oversight falls in 
between these two oversight structures, it is more closely aligned with defense. Although 
the changes were not immediate, Congress did establish permanent standing committees 
in both houses within two years of creating DHS. This is much quicker than the 30 years 
it took to get permanent intelligence committees. Granted, the Senate transformed the 
previous Governmental Affairs Committee into the Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs Committee and did not actually create a new committee. The 
important point is the Senate appointed responsibility, which created a formal mechanism 
for oversight.   
Dedicated committees are extremely important because they allow senators and 
representatives to build expertise in a particular area.259 Executive agencies do not 
always readily volunteer all the information members of Congress need to conduct 
effective oversight.260 Therefore, legislators need to know the correct questions to ask to 
obtain the right information.261 Knowing which questions to ask is primarily a function 
of experience and knowledge in an area.262 Members of a dedicated standing committee 
have the opportunity gain this requisite knowledge. Additionally, members of Congress 
are extremely busy individuals who need wide knowledge about a variety of subjects. 
Therefore, focused oversight and narrow committee jurisdictions may not necessarily be 
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appropriate. As previously noted, oversight is not intended for expediency; it is intended 
to ensure laws are adhered to, government funds are appropriately expended, and the best 
interest of the American public is served.263  
Oversight from multiple committees utilizes the expertise of members of 
Congress from a variety of backgrounds to ensure these goals are achieved. DoD receives 
oversight from dozens of committees whereas the CIA is overseen by only a handful of 
committees. In many instances, because of “Gang of Four” or “Gang of Eight” briefings 
intelligence oversight does not even benefit from the knowledge of the whole committee 
or their staff. Congressional oversight of DHS mirrors DoD by having dozens of 
committees responsible for its operations. Critics are warranted in asserting that there are 
too many committees responsible for DHS. Congress should always be searching for 
ways to streamline its oversight activities to be more effective and less burdensome to 
executive branch agencies. A substantial reduction in committees with jurisdiction over 
DHS, however, is unwarranted and potentially dangerous. The success of DoD oversight 
makes a compelling case for broadly diffused oversight responsibilities.          
Setting an immediate legislative precedent of being involved in the operations and 
engaged in the oversight of an executive department early in its existence is extremely 
important. In the first few years of the CIA, legislative counsel Walter Pforzheimer 
asserted that the Agency attempted to consult and engage members of Congress in its 
operations but they were simply not interested, or too busy to be bothered.264 This led to 
many damaging precedents and unanticipated consequences that Congress has spent the 
last 65 years attempting to repair. First, the executive branch now asserts the prerogative 
to have complete authority over intelligence operations. Congress is only informed of 
intelligence activities at the executive’s convenience, schedule, and terms. The legislative 
branch has attempted to regain influence over intelligence operations, however, once 
power is relinquished it is extremely difficult to get it back. Congress is consigned to 
passing weak oversight legislation or running the risk of a presidential veto. Additionally, 
major intelligence scandals are the only impetus strong enough to produce even weak 
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legislation. Second, Congress’ expertise in intelligence lagged behind that of other 
federal agencies. Therefore, when it did become involved in the mid- to late 1970s it was 
subject to a steep learning curve while struggling to get information from a non-
cooperative intelligence community. 
In contrast, Congress accepted and embraced its defense oversight 
responsibilities. It was immediately involved in substantive dialogue with the executive 
branch regarding budgetary issues and within ten years the legislative branch was 
affecting important national defense policy issues. Similarly, Congress has been 
extremely involved in homeland security. When DHS was still just an executive “office,” 
members strongly advocated creating an executive level department so Congress could be 
involved in the process.265 They could now confirm the DHS Secretary position, have 
control over the budget, and conduct more rigorous oversight. Additionally, the number 
of hearings, briefings and reports demonstrate that Congress is determined to ensure the 
security of the United States. As many different scholars assert senators and 
representatives may have a variety of motivations including electoral, “particularized 
benefits,” and career ambitions.266 As Diana Evans asserts, however, members of 
Congress are also motivated to further the welfare of the United States.267 Regardless of 
motivations, the most important factor is that Congress is involved. The executive branch 
now expects and accommodates the legislative branch’s participation in homeland 
security issues. Although the relationship is reluctant and tumultuous at times at least the 
dialogue is occurring. Congress can, and certainly will, refine its processes over time. By 
following the model set by congressional oversight of defense the legislative branch is 
poised for success. 
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF BUDGETARY AUTHORITY 
Having accurate and timely information is essential to conducting police patrol 
oversight. Congress must have a mechanism, or a point of leverage, to obtain this 
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information. Executive agencies are not always willing to volunteer information on the 
chance that Congress may disagree with, and then subsequently attempt to obstruct, its 
policies. Budgetary control is the strongest coercive power Congress has to obtain such 
information. The executive branch can question the constitutionality of any such requests 
or simply refuse to follow legislation. They, however, need funds to operate.  
Congress loosened its grasp on the power of the purse over the CIA and weak 
oversight ensued. Getting information on intelligence matters is already complicated by 
secrecy. Inadequate budget control only exacerbated the situation. Additionally, when 
Congress relieved the CIA of normal reporting requirements through the CIA Act of 
1949, they forfeited budgetary power that they still have not been able to get back. In 
contrast, Congress increased its influence over defense policy by doing the exact 
opposite. Through legislation like the Russell Amendment, legislators increased their 
budgetary power over weapons procurement decisions, which in turn increased their 
ability to affect defense policy.   
The structure of Congress’ budgetary control of homeland security has mirrored 
very closely that of DoD. Congress has the structural mechanisms in place to affect 
homeland security policy through the federal budget. The homeland security committees 
in each house of Congress are responsible for producing an annual authorizations bill.268 
Additionally, similar to defense, homeland security has its own appropriations 
subcommittee in both houses.269 Unfortunately, Congress has failed to utilize these 
structures. More than 10 years after the establishment of DHS, Congress has yet to pass a 
homeland security authorizations bill.270 In recent years, draft bills have left committee; 
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however, none have officially been signed into law.271 DHS has been financially 
operating for the last decade by either receiving funding directly from the Appropriations 
Committees or through discrete authorizations bills for individual homeland security 
agencies.272 Although DoD did not receive an authorizations bill for the first 13 years of 
its existence, there should be higher expectations for congressional oversight of homeland 
security. Authorizations processes are much more well-established than they were in 
1947, and this practical experience should easily translate to funding DHS. Expecting an 
authorizations bill in the first year, or even the first five years, may be unreasonable. A 
few years of operating experience provides the necessary data to construct a practical 
authorizations bill. Congress, however, should be able to produce a usable authorizations 
bill after 10 years. 
Still, Congress does have the correct mechanisms in place to conduct proper 
oversight and influence homeland security policy. To this point, Congress has not enacted 
any legislation that diminishes its power of the purse. The budgetary mechanisms in 
position still parallel the successful DoD model. Congress is, however, setting the poor 
precedent that DHS can operate adequately without an authorizations bill. In 2009, the 
Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee aborted its version of 
an authorizations bill because “the Obama administration asked (Committee Chairman 
Joseph Lieberman (I-Connecticut)) not to rush such a measure through Congress 
this fall.”273 The failure of Congress to act is furnishing the executive branch power and 
control that it will later be reluctant to relinquish. Authorizations enable the detailed 
budgetary control over executive branch operations that is required for good police patrol 
oversight. Congress must begin to effectively utilize the budget mechanisms it has 
established for homeland security. 
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C. ADDRESSING THE COMMON CRITIQUES 
Critics most often cite the numbers of committees overseeing homeland security 
when condemning Congress’ DHS oversight efforts. They assert that this disparate 
oversight leads to excess reporting, wasted effort, and conflicting direction. The most 
common causes noted for these problems are partisan politics and congressional “turf 
battles.” While these accusations are not totally without merit, few critics fail to evaluate 
the alternative: a passive Congress that does not engage in robust oversight. It is 
unreasonable to expect the legislative branch immediately to perfect its oversight of 
DHS. Congress needs time to modify its procedures as senators and representatives 
acquire experience. Additionally, as a political institution Congress is going to be subject 
to competition between its members.274 Those holding power in Congress will be 
resistant to change, while those without power will lack the influence to affect 
modifications to the current oversight structure.275 Changes will, however, occur over the 
long term. Several years of executive-legislative discourse ensued before Congress 
passed the Russell Amendment. Congress passed Goldwater-Nichols six years after 
Operation Eagle Claw and three years after Operation Urgent Fury. Radical changes like 
Goldwater-Nichols should not be hastily enacted. In an effort to reform homeland 
security oversight Congress has created homeland security committees and will likely 
continue to fine-tune its homeland security process over the next several years. 
It is difficult to dispute the “electoral connection” associated with both defense 
and homeland security.276 Defense funding for bases, weapons systems, and other 
contracts generates significant income for many members’ of Congress constituencies. 
Homeland security also reaps many of the same advantages while additionally benefitting 
from federal grant money for states and localities. Intelligence, on the other hand, is 
primarily a federal enterprise which brings very few “particularized benefits” for 
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members of Congress and their constituents.277 This does not excuse Congress’ 
negligence of intelligence oversight, but demonstrates that good oversight can result from 
a variety of motivations. While searching for “particularized benefits” members of 
Congress will inevitably engage in a variety of oversight activities. Finally, members of 
Congress are often criticized for doing the very thing they were elected to do; look out for 
their constituent’s best interests. Senators and representatives can easily balance the 
competing interests of re-election and public welfare. If the best interests of the nation are 
at stake, members of Congress are capable of putting aside their personal interests.278      
D. FINAL CONCLUSION                   
Despite indictment of critics, congressional oversight of homeland security is far 
from inoperative. Congress is both assertive and aggressive in its oversight of homeland 
security. These efforts mirror its strong police patrol oversight of defense and run 
contrary to the weak and timid oversight of intelligence. Congress has clearly 
demonstrated to the executive that it has a voice in homeland security policy. 
Additionally, to affect policy and conduct strong oversight Congress needs information 
from the executive branch. Although DHS finds it cumbersome, hearings, reports, and 
briefings are the primary formal methods for Congress to acquire information. Finally, 
DHS was created entirely from pre-existing federal agencies which already had an 
effective oversight structure in place. Immediately, discarding the pre-existing oversight 
structure would be ill-advised. Many members of Congress and their staffs have acquired 
considerable experience overseeing the agencies that comprise DHS. Failing to utilize 
this experience for the sake of expediency would undoubtedly lead to poor or incomplete 
oversight.            
Congress must continue to seek ways to improve its oversight of DHS. Although 
forming committees is a start, there is still much more it can accomplish. First, Congress 
must get a homeland security authorizations bill to the White House. Only authorizations 
give Congress the detailed level of control it needs over DHS. Budgetary control gives 
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Congress’ the leverage to get information and make policy changes. Delaying an 
authorizations bill only empowers the executive and weakens Congress. As proven by 
intelligence oversight, once power is ceded it is very difficult to get back.  
Second, jurisdiction over more functions of DHS should slowly move to the 
homeland security committees. These committees need more oversight authority over the 
major operational elements of DHS such as CBP, USCG, and TSA. Once the senators 
and representatives on the homeland security committees gain sufficient experience to 
oversee these agencies DHS would benefit by more consolidated direction. Finally, 
Congress should hold cross-committee or joint hearings whenever possible to reduce the 
burden on DHS.279 Although, it is not Congress’ responsibility to make life easier for 
DHS, any measures of good faith would only facilitate executive-legislative relations. 
While congressional oversight of homeland security may not yet be efficient, it is 
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